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Ideas on a pure phenomenology and phenomenological
philosophy

First book:

General introduction to pure phenomenology

FOURTH SECTION
REASON AND REALITY

--- EXCERPT ---

FIRST CHAPTER

The noematic sense and the relation to the object.

§ 128 Introduction.

The phenomenological wanderings of the last chapter have led us into pretty much all intentional spheres. Everywhere, guided by the radical point of view of the distinction between real and intentional, between noetic and noematic analysis, we came across structures that branched out again and again. We can no longer deny ourselves the insight that this distinction is in fact a fundamental structure that runs through all intentional structures and must therefore form a dominant leitmotif of phenomenological methodology and determine the course of all research relating to the problems of intentionality.

At the same time, it is clear that with this separation, eo ipso, two radically opposing and yet essentially interrelated regions of being have been set apart. Earlier we emphasized that consciousness should be regarded as a separate region of being. We then recognized, however, that the description of the essence of consciousness leads back to that of what is conscious in it, that the correlate of consciousness is inseparable from consciousness and yet not really contained in it. Thus the noematic is distinguished as an *objectivity* belonging to consciousness and yet *peculiar* to it. We note here that while objects per se (understood in an unmodified sense) stand under fundamentally different supreme genera, all object senses and all completely taken noemata, however different they may otherwise be, are in principle of a single supreme genus. But then it is also true that the beings noema and noesis are inseparable from each other: Every lowest difference on the noematic side eidetically points back to the lowest differences on the noetic side. This naturally carries over to all genus and species formations.

The realization of the essential two-sidedness of intentionality according to noesis and noema has the consequence that a systematic phenomenology must not direct its attention one-sidedly to a real analysis of experiences and especially of intentional ones. The temptation to do so is, however, very great at the beginning, because the historical and natural course from psychology to phenomenology entails that the immanent study of pure experiences, the study of their intrinsic nature, is understood as a matter of course as such a study of their real components. In truth, large areas of eidetic research open up on both sides, which are constantly related to each other and yet, as it turns out, are widely separated. To a large extent, what has been taken for act analysis, for noetic analysis, has been gained in the direction of the "imagined as such", and so it was noematic structures that were described.

In our next considerations we want to direct our attention to the general structure of the noema from a point of view that has often been mentioned so far, but was not the leading one for the noematic analysis: *The phenomenological problem of the relation of consciousness to a representationality* has above all its noematic side. The noema in itself has a representational relation, namely through its own "sense". If we then ask how the "sense" of consciousness approaches the "object", which is its own, and which can be "the same" in manifold acts of very different noematic content, as we see it in the sense, new structures arise whose extraordinary significance is obvious. For, proceeding in this direction and, on the other hand, reflecting on the parallel noeses, we finally come up against the question of what the "pretension" of consciousness to really "refer" to a representational, to be "trifecta", actually means, how "valid"

and "invalid" representational relations are clarified phenomenologically according to noesis and noema: and thus we stand before the great *problems of reason*, the clarification of which on the transcendental ground, the formulation of which as *phenomenological* problems will be our aim in this section.

§ 129 "Content" and "object"; the content as "sense".

In our previous analyses, a universal noematic structure has played a constant role, characterized by the separation of a certain *noematic "core"* from the alternating "*characters*" belonging to it, with which the noematic concretion appears to be drawn into the flow of various modifications. This core had not yet come to its scientific right. It stood out intuitively, uniformly and clearly to the extent that we could refer to it in general. Now it is time to take a closer look at it and place it at the center of phenomenological analysis. As soon as this is done, universally significant differences emerge that run through all genres of acts and are guiding for large groups of studies.

We take up the usual equivocal talk of the content of consciousness. As content we take the "sense" of which we say that in it or through it consciousness refers to an object as "its own". We take the sentence as the title and aim of our discussion, so to speak:

Every noema has a "*content*", namely its "meaning", and relates to "its" *object* through it.

In recent times one often hears it praised as a great advance that the fundamental distinction between act, content and object has finally been made. The three words in this summary have almost become catchwords, especially since Twardowski's fine treatise. However, as great and undoubtedly the merit of this author was to have astutely discussed certain common confluences and made their errors evident, it must be said that he did not (which is not to be censured) go much further in the clarification of the corresponding conceptual essences than what was well known to the philosophers of earlier generations (despite their careless confluences). Radical progress was not even possible before a systematic phenomenology of consciousness. We are not helped by phenomenologically unexplained terms such as "act", "content", "object" of "ideas". What cannot all be called act and especially what cannot all be called content of an idea and idea itself. And what can be called this must be recognized scientifically.

In this respect, a first and, as it seems to me, necessary step was attempted through the phenomenological differentiation of "matter" and "quality", through the idea of the "intentional being" in its separation from the "epistemological being". The one-sidedness of the noetic perspective, in which these distinctions were made and meant, is easily overcome by considering the noematic parallels. We can thus understand the terms noematically; the "quality" (quality of judgment, quality of desire, etc.) is nothing other than what we have so far treated as "positing" character, "thetic" character in the broadest sense. The expression, originating in contemporary psychology (Brentano's), now seems to me not very appropriate; every peculiar thesis has its quality, but it is not itself to be described as a quality. Obviously, the "matter", which is the "what" that is characterized by the "quality", corresponds to the "noematic core".

The consistent development of this beginning, the deeper clarification, the further decomposition of these concepts and their correct implementation through all noetic-noematic areas is now the task. Any truly successful progress in this direction must be of exceptional importance for phenomenology. After all, we are not dealing with lateral specialties, but with essential moments that belong to the central structure of every intentional experience.

In order to get a little closer to things, let's consider the following.

The intentional experience has, it is customary to say, "*relation to something objective*"; but it is also said to be "*consciousness of something*", e.g. consciousness of a blossoming apple tree, the one here in this garden. We will not initially consider it necessary to distinguish between the two ways of speaking in view of such examples. If we recall our previous analyses, we find the full noesis related to the full noema, as its intentional and full what. It is then clear, however, that this relation cannot be that which is meant in the talk of the relation of consciousness to its intentional representational; for to every noetic moment, especially to every thetic-noetic moment, corresponds a moment in the noema, and in this the noematic core characterized by it is distinct from the complex of thetic characters. Let us also remember the "gaze upon" that possibly passes through the noesis (through the actual cogito), which transforms the specifically thetic moments into rays of the actuality of the I's positing, and let us pay close attention to how this I now "directs" itself with them as grasping, or supposing, wishing, etc., towards the objective. and if we pay close attention to how this I now "directs" itself with them towards the objective, how its gaze passes through the noematic core - then we become aware that with the talk of the relationship (and especially "direction") of consciousness to its objective we are referred to an *innermost* moment of the noema. It is not the core itself that has just been described, but something that constitutes the necessary central point of the core, so to speak, and functions as a "carrier" for noematic peculiarities specifically belonging to it, namely for the noematically modified properties of the "unified as such".

As soon as we go into this in more detail, we realize that the distinction between "content" and "object" is indeed to be made not only for "consciousness", for the intentional experience, but also for the *noema in itself*. Thus the noema also relates to an object and possesses a "content", "by means" of which it relates to the object: whereby the object is the same as that of the noema; as then the "parallelism" again proves itself throughout.

§ 130. delimitation of the essence of the "noematic sense".

Let us take a closer look at these strange structures. We simplify the consideration by leaving the attentional modifications out of consideration; by further restricting ourselves to positional acts, in whose theses we live, possibly depending on the stage sequence of the foundations, sometimes in one, sometimes in the other partial thesis primarily, while the others are in execution, but in secondary function. That our analyses do not suffer in the least from such simplifications with regard to the generality of their validity can be made clear subsequently and without further ado. We are dealing with a being that is insensitive to such modifications.

If we place ourselves in a living cogito, then, according to its nature, it has an excellent "direction" towards a representationality. In other words, its noema includes a "representationality" - in quotation marks - with a certain noematic stock, which unfolds in a description of a certain boundary, namely one that *avoids all "subjective" expressions* as a *description of the "supposed representational, as it is supposed"*. Formal-ontological expressions such as "object", "quality", "fact" are used; material-ontological expressions such as "thing", "figure", "cause"; technical terms such as "rough", "hard", "colored" - all have their quotation marks, i.e. the noematic-modified sense. *Excluded* from the description of this supposed objective as such, however, are expressions such as "perceptual", "memorable", "clear-sighted", "mental", "given" - they belong to a different dimension of descriptions, not to the objective *that*

is conscious, but to the *way in which it is conscious*. On the other hand, in the case of an object that appears, it would again fall within the scope of the description in question to say that its "front" is *determined in* such and such a way according to color, shape, etc., that its "back" has "a" color, but an *unspecified* one, that it is generally *indeterminate* in such and such respects, whether it is like this or like that.

This applies not only to natural objects but in general, e.g. to objects of value; their description includes the description of the supposed "thing" and the predicates of the "value", as when we say of the appearing tree "in the sense" of our evaluative opinion that it is covered with "wonderfully" fragrant blossoms. The predicates of value also have their quotation marks; they are not predicates of a value per se, but of a value noema.

Obviously, this delineates a very *fixed content in every noema*. Every consciousness has its *what* and every supposed "its" objective; it is evident that we must be able to carry out such a noematic description of it, "exactly as it is supposed to be", in principle; through explication and conceptual formulation we gain a closed epitome of formal or material, factually determined or also "indeterminate" ("empty" supposed) "*predicates*", and these in their *modified meaning* determine the "*content*" of the object core of the noema in question.

§ 131. the "object", the "determinable X in the noematic sense".

But the predicates are predicates of "*something*", and this "something" also belongs, and apparently inseparably, to the core in question: it is the central point of unity of which we spoke above. It is the point of connection or "carrier" of the predicates, but by no means a unity of them in the sense in which any complex, any connection of the predicates could be called a unity. It is necessary to distinguish it from them, although it cannot be placed alongside them and separated from them, just as, conversely, they themselves are *its* predicates: unthinkable without it and yet distinguishable from it. We say that the intentional object is always conscious in the continuous or synthetic progress of consciousness, but always "gives itself differently" in it; it is "*the same*", it is only given in other predicates, with a different determinative content, "it" only shows itself from different sides, whereby the predicates that have remained indeterminate have become more definite; or "the" object has remained unchanged in this stretch of the given, but now "it", the identical, changes, it increases in beauty through this change, it loses utility, etc. If this is always understood as a *noematic description* of the respective thing as such, and if this description is carried out in pure adequation, as is possible at any time, then the identical intentional "object" is evidently separated from the changing and mutable "predicates". It separates itself as a *central noematic moment*: the "*object*", the "object", the "*identical*", the "determinable subject of its possible predicates" - *the pure X in abstraction from all predicates* - and it separates itself from these predicates, or more precisely, from the predicate noemes.

To the *one* object we assign manifold modes of consciousness, acts, or actnoemes. Obviously this is nothing accidental; none is conceivable without manifold intentional experiences, linked in continuous or in actually synthetic (polythetic) unity, in which "it", the object, is conscious as identical and yet in noematically different ways: in such a way that the characterized core is a changeable one and the "object", the pure subject of the predicates, is precisely an identical one. It is clear that we can already regard each section of the immanent duration of an act as an "act" and the total act as a certain unanimous unity of the continuously connected acts. We can then say: several act noemata have *different nuclei* everywhere, but in such a way that they

nevertheless *unite to form a unity of identity*, a unity in which the "something", the determinable, which lies in each nucleus, is conscious as identical.

In the same way, however, *separate* acts, such as two perceptions or a perception and a memory, can unite to form a "unanimous" unity, and due to the peculiar nature of this unification, which is obviously not alien to the nature of the united acts, the something of the initially *separate nuclei*, which may be determined once in one way and the other differently, is now conscious as the same something, or as unanimously the same "object".

Thus, in every noema there is such a pure object-something as a point of unity, and at the same time we see how, in noematic terms, two different concepts of object are to be distinguished: this pure point of unity, this *noematic "object per se"* and the "*object in the how of its determinateness*" - plus the respective "indeterminacies that remain open" and that are also memorized in this mode. This "how" is to be taken precisely as that which the respective act prescribes, as that which really belongs to its noema. The "*sense*" of which we have repeatedly spoken is this *noematic "object in the how"* with everything that the *description characterized above* can evidently find in it and express conceptually.

Note that we are now careful to say "sense", not "core". For it will turn out that in order to gain the real, concretely complete core of the noema, we still have to take into account a dimension of differences that is not expressed in the description that characterizes and defines the sense for us. If we stick here first of all purely to that which it grasps, then the "sense" is a property of the noema. It is from noema to noema generally a changing one, but under certain circumstances an absolutely identical one and possibly even characterized as "identical"; insofar as the "object in the manner of determinateness" stands on both sides as the same and absolutely identically to be described. In no noema can it be missing and its necessary center, the point of unity, the pure determinable X can be missing. No "sense" without the "*something*" and again without "*determining content*". It is evident that such a thing is not only introduced by subsequent analysis and description, but that it really lies in the correlate of consciousness as a condition of the possibility of evident description and before it.

Through the sense carrier belonging to the sense (as an empty X) and the *possibility of unanimous connection to sense units of any level*, which is founded in the nature of the senses, not only does each sense have its "object", but different senses relate to *the same* object, precisely insofar as they can be classified in sense units in which the *determinable X of the unified senses coincide with each other and with the X of the overall sense of the respective sense unit*.

Our explanation is transferred from the monothetic acts to the *synthetic*, or more clearly, to the polythetic. In a thetically structured consciousness, each member has the described noematic structure; each has its X with its "determining content"; but in addition, the noema of the synthetic total act, with reference to the "archontic" Thesis, has the synthetic X and *its* determining content. In the act of completion, the ray of vision of the pure I, dividing itself into a multiplicity of rays, goes to the Xs coming to the synthetic unity. In the transformation of the nominalization, the synthetic phenomenon as a whole is modified in such a way that a ray of actuality goes to the highest synthetic X.

§ 132 The core as meaning in the mode of its fullness.

Sense, as we have defined it, is *not a concrete being* in the overall state of the noema, but a kind of abstract *form* inherent in it. If we hold on to the sense, that is, to the "what is meant" precisely with the determinative content in which it is meant, then a *second* concept of the "object in the how" *in the how of its modes of being* arises clearly. If we disregard the attentional modifications, all differences of the kind of the modes of realization, then - always in the preferred sphere of positionality - the differences of the fullness of clarity come into consideration, which are cognitively so determining. A darkly conscious as such and the same clearly conscious are very different in terms of their noematic concretion, as well as the whole experiences are. But there is nothing to prevent the determinative content with which the darkly conscious is supposed to be absolutely identical with that of the clearly conscious. The descriptions would coincide, and a synthetic unity consciousness could embrace the two consciousnesses in such a way that they would really be the same thing. We will then count as the *full core* the full concretion of the noematic constituent in question, that is, the *sense in the mode of its fullness*.

§ 133 The noematic proposition. Thetic and synthetic propositions. Propositions in the domain of ideas.

What is needed now is a careful implementation of these distinctions in all act areas, as well as the supplementary consideration of *the thetic moments*, which have a special relationship to sense as noematic. In the "Logical Investigations" they were included from the outset (under the title Quality) in the concept of sense (the "meaningful essence") and thus in this unity the two components "matter" (sense in the present version) and quality were distinguished. But it seems more appropriate to define the term sense merely as that "matter", and then to designate the unity of sense and thetic character as *proposition*. We then have *single-membered propositions* (as in the case of perceptions and other thetic views) and multi-membered, *synthetic propositions*, such as predicative doxic propositions (judgments), conjectural propositions with predicatively structured matter, etc. Single-membered and multi-membered sentences are also *sentences of pleasure, sentences of desire, sentences of command*, etc. The concept of the proposition is thus, of course, extraordinarily and perhaps strangely extended, but nevertheless within the framework of an important unit of essence. It must always be kept in mind that the terms sense and proposition contain nothing of expression and conceptual meaning for us, but on the other hand all explicit propositions or propositional meanings deal with each other.

According to our analyses, these terms denote an abstract layer belonging to the full fabric of all noemata. It is of great importance for our knowledge to gain this layer in its complete generality, i.e. to recognize that it really has its place in *all act spheres*. Even in the simple views the concepts of sense and proposition, which belong inseparably to the concept of object, have their necessary application; the special concepts *of sense of view* and *proposition of view* must necessarily be coined. Thus, for example, in the realm of external perception, the sense of the object, the *sense of the thing of this perception*, which is different from perception to perception (even with respect to "the same" thing), is to be seen out of the "perceived object as such" by abstracting from the character of perception, as something lying in this noema before all explicating and comprehending thought. If we take this sense fully, with its vivid *fullness*, a

certain and very important concept of *appearance* emerges. These senses correspond to propositions, propositions of perception, propositions of imagination, perceptual propositions, etc. In a phenomenology of external views, which as such is not concerned with objects per se, in an unmodified sense, but with noems as correlates of noeses, concepts such as those highlighted here are at the center of scientific research.

If we first return to the general topic, the task now arises of systematically distinguishing the basic types of the senses, the simple and synthetic (i.e. those belonging to synthetic acts), the senses of the first and higher levels. Following in part the basic types of determinations of content, in part the basic forms of synthetic formations, which play their role in the same way for all areas of meaning, and thus taking into account everything in general that a priori determines the general structure of the senses according to form and content, is common to all spheres of consciousness, or is peculiar to generically closed spheres - we ascend to the *idea of a systematic and universal theory of forms of the senses* (meanings). If we take into account the systematic differentiation of the characters of the propositions, then a *systematic typology of the propositions* is achieved at the same time.

§ 134 Apophantic theory of forms.

One of the main tasks here is to develop a systematic "analytic" *theory of the forms of "logical" meanings*, or of *predicative propositions*, of "judgments" in the sense of formal logic, which takes account only of the forms of *analytic* or *predicative synthesis*, and leaves undefined the terms of meaning that enter into these forms. Although this task is a special one, it has universal scope in that the title predicative synthesis designates a class of possible operations for all possible kinds of sense; everywhere equally possible operations of explication and of the referring conception of the explicated: as determination of the subject of determination, as part of the whole, as a relatum of its referent, and so on. Operations of collection, of disjunction, of hypothetical connection are intertwined with this. All of this before any statement and the new explicit or "conceptual" version that emerges with it, which clings to all forms and materials as a meaningful expression.

This theory of forms, the idea of which we have already touched on several times, and which, according to our explanations, constitutes the principally necessary sub-stage of a scientific *mathesis universalis*, loses its isolation through the results of the present investigations; it gains its home within the general theory of forms of the senses conceived as an idea in general and its final place of origin in noematic phenomenology.

Let's take a closer look.

The analytic-syntactic operations are, we said, possible operations for all possible senses, or propositions, whatever determinate content the respective noematic sense (which is nothing other than the "supposed" object as such and in the respective how of its determinate content) may contain "non-explicated" in itself. However, it can always be explicated and any of the operations essentially connected with explication ("analysis") can be carried out. The synthetic forms that arise in this way (in reference to the grammatical "syntaxes" we also called them syntactic forms) are quite specific, belonging to a fixed system of forms, to be emphasized through abstraction and to be grasped conceptually-explicitly. Thus, for example, we can treat what we perceive in simple perceptual theses as such in an analytical way, which is indicated by the expressions: "This is black, an inkwell, this black inkwell is not white, if white it is not

black" and the like. With each step we have a new meaning, instead of the original one-part sentence a synthetic sentence, which, according to the law of the expressibility of all primal-dox sentences, can be brought to expression, or to a predicative statement. Within the structured propositions, each member has its syntactic form derived from analytic synthesis.

Let us assume that the propositions belonging to these sense forms are *doxical primal propositions*: this gives rise to various forms of judgments in the logical sense (*apophantic propositions*). The aim of determining all these forms a priori, of mastering in systematic completeness the infinitely manifold and yet law-bounded structures of forms, denotes for us the idea of a *theory of forms of apophantic propositions, or syntaxes*.

However, the propositions and especially the synthetic overall proposition can also be doxic modalities: For example, we assume and explicate what is conscious in the mode "presumably"; or it stands there as questionable, and in the consciousness of questionability we explicate what is questionable, etc. If we express the noematic correlates of these modalities ("S might be p", "Is S p"? etc.), and if we do the same for the simple predicative judgment itself, as we also express affirmation and negation (e.g. "S is not p", "S is p", "S is certainly, really p") - *the concept of form* and the idea of the theory of forms of propositions *is thus extended*. The form is now determined several times, partly by the actual syntactic forms, partly by the doxic modalities. At all times there remains an overall thesis belonging to the sentence as a whole, and a doxic thesis resolved in it. At the same time, each such sentence and the conceptual "expression" directly adapted to it can be transformed into a propositional sentence by an explication of meaning and predication, which transforms the modal characteristic into a predicate, into a judgment which judges the modality of a content of and of the form (e.g. "It is certain, it is possible, probable that S is p").

In a similar way as with the modalities of judgment, it is the same with *well-founded theses*, or senses and propositions of the *sphere of mind and will*, with the syntheses specifically belonging to them and the corresponding modes of expression. The aim of the new doctrines of the forms of propositions and especially synthetic propositions is then easily identified.

At the same time we see *that in a suitably extended theory of forms of the doxic propositions* - if we take over the modalities of being in the same way as the modalities of ought (if the analogizing speech is permitted) into the matter of judgment - *the theory of forms of all propositions* is reflected. What this adoption means probably needs no long discussion, but at most illustration by examples: instead of "S may be p" we say, for instance, that S is p, that may be, it is desired (not desired); instead of "S should be p": that S is p, that should be, it is a desired thing, etc.

Phenomenology itself does not see its task in the systematic development of these theories of form, in which, as can be learned from the apophantic theory of form, the systematic possibilities of all further formations are deductively derived from primitive axiomatic basic formations; its field is the analysis of the a priori that can be demonstrated in *direct* intuition, the fixation of directly comprehensible beings and essential connections and their descriptive cognition in the systematic association of all layers in transcendently pure consciousness. What the theorizing logician isolates in the formal theory of meaning, treating it as if it were something in itself, due to his one-sided direction of interest, without considering and understanding the noematic and noetic connections in which it is phenomenologically interwoven - the phenomenologist takes this in its full context. His great task is to pursue the phenomenological interrelationships of essence *from all sides*. Every simple axiomatic statement of a basic logical concept becomes a

title for phenomenological investigations. Even what is simply pointed out there in the broadest logical generality as a "proposition" (proposition of judgement), as a categorical or hypothetical proposition, as an attributive determination, nominalized adjective or relative, etc., results in difficult and far-reaching problem groups of pure phenomenology as soon as it is embedded in the corresponding noematic contexts of essence from which the theorizing view has lifted it out.

§ 135 Object and consciousness. Transition to the phenomenology of reason.

Just as every intentional experience has a noema and therein a sense through which it relates to the object, so, conversely, everything that we call *object*, of which we speak, what we have before our eyes as reality, what we consider possible or probable, no matter how indeterminately we think of it, is precisely thereby already an object of consciousness; and this says that whatever world and reality may be and be called in general must be represented within the framework of real and possible consciousness by corresponding senses or propositions filled with more or less descriptive content. If, therefore, phenomenology carries out "eliminations", if, as transcendental, it brackets all actual positing of realities and carries out the other bracketing that we described earlier, then we now understand for a deeper reason the meaning and the correctness of the earlier thesis: that everything phenomenologically excluded nevertheless belongs, with a certain change of sign, within the framework of phenomenology. Namely, the real and ideal realities that are subject to elimination are represented in the phenomenological sphere by the total manifold of senses and propositions that correspond to them.

Thus, for example, every real thing of nature is represented by all the senses and alternately fulfilled propositions in which it is the correlate of possible intentional experiences, as such and such determined and further to be determined; thus represented by the manifoldness of "full nuclei", or, what means the same here, of all possible "subjective manifestations" in which it can be constituted as an identical noematic. This constitution, however, refers first of all to an essentially possible individual consciousness, then also to a possible communal consciousness, i.e. to an essentially possible majority of consciousness-items and streams of consciousness that are in "communication", for which *a* thing can be given and identified intersubjectively as the same objectively real thing. It should always be noted that all our explanations, including the present one, are to be understood in the sense of phenomenological reductions and in eidetic generality.

On the other hand, to each thing, and finally to the whole world of things with the one space and the one time, correspond the manifolds of possible noetic occurrences, the possible experiences of the singular individuals and communal individuals relating to them, experiences which, as parallels of the noematic manifolds considered above, have in their very nature the peculiarity of relating to this world of things according to sense and proposition. In them, then, the relevant manifolds of hyletic data occur with the corresponding "conceptions", thetic act-characters, etc., which in their connected unity constitute precisely what we call *experiential consciousness* of this thinghood. The unity of the thing is contrasted with an infinite ideal multiplicity of noetic experiences of a quite definite and, in spite of its infinity, clearly comprehensible essential content, all united in being consciousness of "the same thing". This unity is realized in the sphere of consciousness itself, in experiences that in turn belong to the group that we have delimited here.

For the limitation to the experiencing consciousness was only meant as an example, as was the limitation to the "things" of the "world". Everything and everything is, however far we stretch the frame and in whatever level of generality and particularity we move - down to the lowest concretions - essentially predetermined. The sphere of experience is as strictly lawful according to its transcendental structure of essence, as firmly is every possible form of essence determined in it according to noesis and noema, as every possible figure to be drawn into it is determined by the essence of space - according to absolutely valid laws. What here is called possibility (eidetic existence) on both sides is thus absolutely necessary possibility, an absolutely fixed link in an absolutely fixed structure of an eidetic system. Its scientific realization is the goal, i.e. its theoretical expression and mastery in a system of concepts and statements of law arising from pure intuition of essence. All fundamental distinctions made by formal ontology and the theory of categories that follows it - the doctrine of the division of the regions of being and their categories of being, as well as the constitution of ontologies that are appropriate to them - are, as we will understand in detail as we proceed, main titles for phenomenological investigations. They necessarily correspond to noetic-noematic contexts of being, which must be systematically described and determined according to possibilities and necessities.

If we consider in more detail what the essential connections between object and consciousness characterized in the above consideration mean or must mean, we become aware of an ambiguity and, following it, we realize that we are facing a major turning point in our investigations. We assign to an object a multiplicity of "propositions" or experiences of a certain noematic content, in such a way that through it syntheses of identification a priori become possible, by virtue of which the object can and must stand as the same. The X in the different acts, or actnoemes endowed with different "determinative content", is necessarily conscious as the same. But *is it really the same? And is the object itself "real"?* Could it not be unreal, while the manifold unanimous and even view-filled propositions - propositions of whatever essential content - proceeded consciously?

We are not interested in the factualities of consciousness and its processes, but in the problems of essence that need to be formulated here. Consciousness, or the subject of consciousness itself, *judges* reality, asks about it, suspects it, doubts it, decides the doubt and in doing so carries out "*judgments of reason*". Should it not be possible to clarify the nature of this right and, correlatively, the nature of "reality" - in relation to all kinds of objects, according to all formal and regional categories - in the essential context of transcendental consciousness, i.e. purely phenomenologically?

There was therefore an ambiguity in our talk of the noetic-noematic "constitution" of objects, e.g. object objects. In any case, we were thinking primarily of "real" objects, of things of the "real world" or at least of "a" real world in general. But what does this "real" mean for objects that are only given consciously through senses and propositions? What does it mean for these propositions themselves, for the nature of these nouns, or the parallel nouns? What does it say about the particular ways in which they are constructed in terms of form and fullness? How does this construction differ according to the particular regions of the subject? The question, then, is how, in phenomenological scientificity, all those contexts of consciousness are to be described noetically or noematically that make an object par excellence (which, in the sense of ordinary speech, always means a *real* object) necessary in its reality. In a *broader* sense, however, an object - "whether it is real or not" - is "constituted" in certain contexts of consciousness that carry

within them a comprehensible unity, insofar as they essentially carry the consciousness of an identical X with them.

In fact, the above does not merely concern realities in any concise sense. Questions of reality are inherent in *all* cognitions as such, even in our phenomenological cognitions related to the possible constitution of objects: All of them, after all, have their correlates in "objects" that are meant as "really-being". When, it can be asked everywhere, is the noematically "supposed" identity of X "real identity" instead of "merely" supposed, and what does this "merely supposed" mean everywhere?

We must therefore devote new considerations to the problems of reality and the correlative problems of the consciousness of reason that it contains.

SECOND CHAPTER
Phenomenology of reason

If one speaks of objects in a bad way, one normally means real, truly existing objects of the respective category of being. Whatever one then says about the objects - if one speaks reasonably - it must be possible to "*substantiate*", "*prove*", directly "*see*" or *indirectly* "*see*" what is meant. In *principle*, in the logical sphere, in that of the statement, "*to be true*" or "*to be real*" and "*to be reasonably demonstrable*" are correlated; and this applies to all doxic modalities of being or positing. Of course, the possibility of sensible designation in question here is not understood as empirical, but as "ideal", as an essential possibility.

§ The first basic form of rational consciousness: the original "seeing".

If we now ask what rational designation means, i.e. what the *consciousness of reason* consists in, the intuitive visualization of examples and the beginning of an analysis of essence carried out on them immediately offers us several differences:

For the *time* being, the difference between positional experiences in which the lawful comes *to an original given* and those in which it *does not* come to such a given: that is, between "*perceiving*", "*seeing*" *acts - in the broadest sense - and non-"perceiving" acts*.

Thus a consciousness of memory, such as that of a landscape, is not original; the landscape is not perceived as if we were really seeing it. By no means do we mean to say that the consciousness of memory is without its own right: it is just not a "seeing" consciousness. Phenomenology exhibits an analog of this contrast for *all kinds of positional* experiences: We can, for example, predicate in a "blind" way that $2 + 1 = 1 + 2$, but we can also carry out the same judgment in an insightful way. Then the fact, the synthetic objectivity corresponding to the synthesis of judgment, is originally given, originally grasped. It is no longer so *after* the living execution of the insight, which immediately darkens into a retentional modification. This may also have a rational advantage over any other dark or confused consciousness of the same noematic sense, e.g. over a "thoughtless" reproduction of what was once learned and perhaps grasped - it is no longer an original giving consciousness.

These differences do not concern the pure sense or proposition; for this is an identical one in the members of each such pair of examples and is also consciously comprehensible as an identical one at all times. The difference concerns the *way in which the mere sense or proposition*, which as a mere abstract in the concretion of the noema of consciousness demands a plus of supplementary moments, *is fulfilled or unfulfilled sense and proposition*.

Fullness of sense alone does not make the difference, it also depends on *how* it is fulfilled. One way of experiencing the sense is the "*intuitive*" way, whereby the "perceived object as such" is more vividly conscious, and a particularly excellent case is that the way of seeing is precisely the *original giving way*. The sense in the perception of the landscape is perceptually fulfilled, the perceived object with its colors, forms, etc. (insofar as they "fall into perception") is conscious in the manner of "corporeal". We find similar distinctions in all act spheres. The factual situation is again a double-sided one in the sense of parallelism, a noetic and noematic one. In the attitude towards the noema we find the character of corporeality (as original fulfillment) fused with the pure sense, and *the sense with this character now functions as the basis of the noematic*

character of positing, or what says the same thing here: the character of being. The parallel applies in the attitude towards the noesis.

A specific rational character, however, is inherent to the character of positing as a distinction that is essentially attributed to it if and only if it is positing on the basis of a fulfilled, originally giving sense and not just a sense at all.

Here and in every kind of rational consciousness, the talk of belonging takes on a meaning of its own. For example: the positing belongs to every physical appearance of a thing, it is not only one with this appearance in general (for example, even as a mere general fact - which is out of the question here), it is peculiarly one with it, it is "motivated" by it, and yet again not merely motivated in general, but "rationally motivated". The same is true: the original fact is the original legal ground of the act. In other states of affairs the legal ground need not be absent, but the advantage of the original ground, which plays an excellent role in the relative estimation of legal grounds, is absent.

In the same way, the positing of the "originally" given essence or essence-behavior in the perception of essence "belongs" to its positing "material", the "sense" in its way of being given. It is a reasonable and originally motivated positing as certainty of faith; it has the specific character of "insight". If the positing is a blind one, if the meanings of the words are carried out on the basis of a dark and confusedly conscious background of the act, then the rational character of the insight is necessarily lacking; it is essentially incompatible with such a givenness (if one still wants to use this word here) of the state of affairs, or such a noematic endowment of the sense core. On the other hand, this does not exclude a secondary rational character, as the example of imperfect re-presentation of essential knowledge shows.

Insight, evidence in general, is thus a quite excellent occurrence; at its "core" it is the unity of a rational proposition with what essentially motivates it, whereby this whole situation can be understood noetically, but also noematically. The talk of motivation is particularly appropriate to the relationship between the (noetic) proposition and the noematic proposition in its way of fulfillment. The expression "evident proposition" is immediately understandable in its noematic meaning.

The double sense of the word evidence in its application sometimes to noetic characters or full acts (e.g. evidence of judgment), sometimes to noematic propositions (e.g. evident logical judgment, evident proposition) is a case of the general and necessary ambiguities of expressions referring to moments of correlation between noesis and noema. The phenomenological proof of their source renders them harmless and even reveals their indispensability.

It should also be noted that the talk of fulfillment has a double meaning in a completely different direction: On the one hand, it is "fulfillment of intention", as a character that the current thesis takes on through the particular mode of the sense; on the other hand, it is precisely the peculiarity of this mode itself, or the peculiarity of the sense in question, to contain within itself a "fullness" that motivates rationally.

§ 137 Evidence and insight. "Original" and "pure", assertoric and apodictic evidence.

The pairs of examples used above also illustrate a second and third essential difference. What we usually call evidence and insight (or insight) is a positional doxic and thereby adequately giving consciousness, which "excludes otherness"; the thesis is motivated by the adequate given in a quite exceptional way and is in the highest sense an act of "reason". This is illustrated by the

arithmetical example. In that of the landscape we have a seeing, but not an evidence in the usual concise sense of the word, an "insight". On closer inspection, we notice a *double difference* in the contrasted examples: in one example we are dealing with *essence*, in the other with *the individual*; secondly, the original fact in the eidetic example is an *adequate* one, in the example from the sphere of experience an *inadequate* one. Both differences, which may intersect, will prove to be significant with regard to the nature of the evidence.

As far as the former difference is concerned, it must be stated phenomenologically that the "assertoric" seeing, so to speak, *of an individual*, e.g., the "knowing" of a thing or of an individual state of affairs, differs essentially in its rational character from an "apodictic" seeing, *from the insight into an essence or state of affairs*; but likewise also from the modification of this insight, which may take place through a mixture of both, namely, in the case of the application of an insight to *an assertorically seen individual and*, in general, in the realization of the necessity of the being *of a posited individual*. This is the case in the application of an insight to an assertorically seen thing and generally in the *realization of the necessity of the being* of a posited individual.

Evidence and insight are understood to be synonymous in the usual concise sense: as apodictic insight. We want to separate the two words terminologically. We certainly need a more general word that encompasses assertoric seeing and apodictic insight in its meaning. It is to be regarded as a phenomenological insight of the greatest importance that both are really of *one* essential genus and that, even more generally, *consciousness of reason in general* denotes a *supreme genus of thetic modalities* in which "seeing" (in the extremely extended sense) related to original givenness constitutes a firmly limited species. In naming the highest genus, one now has the choice of either extending the meaning of the word "seeing" (as we have just done, but going much further) or that of the words "insight" and "evidence". It might be most appropriate to choose the word *evidence* for the most general term; for every reason-thesis characterized by a motivational relation to the originality of the given, the term *original evidence* would then present itself. Furthermore, a distinction should be made between *assertoric* and *apodictic evidence* and the word *insight* should be given the special designation of this *apodicticity*. Subsequently, *pure* insight and *impure* (e.g. knowledge of the necessity of a fact whose existence need not even be evident) would have to be contrasted; and likewise *pure and impure evidence* in general.

Other differences also emerge when one delves deeper into the research, differences in the motivating documents that affect the character of the evidence. For example, the difference between *purely formal* ("analytical", "logical") and *material* (synthetic-apophoretic) evidence. But we must not go beyond the first lines here.

§ 138 Adequate and inadequate evidence.

Let us now consider the second difference of evidence indicated above, which is connected with that of adequate and inadequate givenness and at the same time gives us the occasion to describe an excellent type of "impure" evidence. The positing on the basis of the bodily appearance of the *thing* is indeed a reasonable one, but the appearance is always only a one-sided, "imperfect" appearance; not only that which "actually" appears stands there as bodily conscious, but simply this thing itself, the whole according to the entire, although only one-sidedly vivid and also variously indeterminate sense. Here, what "actually" appears is not to be

separated from the thing as a thing in itself; it forms its sensory correlate in the full sense of the thing, a *dependent* part that can only have sensory unity and independence in a whole that *necessarily* contains empty components and indeterminate components.

In principle, a thing-real, a being of such a sense can only appear "*inadequately*" in a completed appearance. This is essentially connected with the fact that *no rational positing based on such an inadequately giving appearance* can be "*final*", none can be "*insurmountable*"; that none in its isolation is equivalent to the absolute: "The thing is real", but is only equivalent to: "It is real" - provided that the progress of experience does not bring about "stronger motives of reason", which make the original positing stand out as one to be "passed through" in the wider context. The proposition is rationally motivated only by the appearance (the imperfectly fulfilled sense of perception) in and of itself, considered in its isolation.

The phenomenology of reason in the sphere of the kinds of being that can in principle only be given inadequately (the *transcendentals* in the sense of realities) thus has to study the various occurrences that are a priori predetermined in this sphere. It has to clarify how the inadequate consciousness of the given, how the one-sided appearance in continuous progression relates to ever new, continuously merging appearances with one and the same determinable X, which possibilities of being arise here; how here, on the one hand, a progression of experiences is possible and always rationally motivated by the continuously preceding rationalizations: precisely the course of experience in which the empty spaces of the preceding phenomena are filled in, the indeterminacies are more closely determined, and thus perpetually in the manner of *continuous unanimous fulfillment with their constantly increasing rational power*. On the other hand, the opposite possibilities are to be clarified, the *cases of mergers or polythetic syntheses of inconsistency*, of the "*other determination*" of the X that is always conscious as the same - other than the original meaning of the earlier perceptual process together with its sense; how under certain circumstances the whole perception *explodes*, so to speak, and disintegrates into "*conflicting conceptions of things*", approaches to things; how the theses of these approaches cancel each other out and in this cancellation are peculiarly modified; or how one thesis, remaining unmodified, "conditions" the crossing out of the "counter-thesis"; and what other such occurrences.

Furthermore, the peculiar modifications that the original rational propositions undergo in that they experience a *positive phenomenological increase* in terms of their *motivating "force"* in the course of unanimous fulfillment, that they constantly gain "*weight*", i.e. that they always and essentially contain weight, but a *gradually* different one. Furthermore, the other possibilities are to be analyzed in terms of how the weight of positings suffers due to "*counter-motives*", how they "*balance* each other out" in case of *doubt*, how a positing in bankruptcy is "*outweighed*" by one of "stronger" weight, "*surrendered*", etc.

In addition to all this, of course, the events that essentially determine the changes in the positing characters in the sense of the associated *positing matter* must be subjected to a comprehensive essence analysis (e.g. the events of the "conflict" or "contest" of phenomena). For here, as everywhere in the phenomenological sphere, there are no coincidences, no factualities, everything is essentially motivated. -

In the same way, in the context of a general phenomenology of noetic and noematic conditions, the *investigation of the essence of all kinds of immediate acts of reason* would have to be carried out.

Each region and category of pretended objects corresponds phenomenologically not only to a basic type of senses or propositions, but also to a basic type of original giving consciousness of such senses and to a basic type of original evidence belonging to it, which is essentially motivated by such an original given.

Any such evidence - the word understood in our extended sense - is either *adequate*, in principle no longer to be "affirmed" or "invalidated", i.e. *without gradualness of weight*; or it is *inadequate* and thus *capable of increase and decrease*. Whether this or that kind of evidence is possible in a sphere depends on its genus type; it is therefore a priori pre-formed, and to demand the perfection that belongs to evidence in one sphere (e.g. that of essential relations) in other spheres that exclude it in terms of essence is absurd.

It should also be noted that we may transfer the original meaning of the terms "adequate" and "inadequate", which is related to the way things are, to the essential properties of the rational propositions themselves, which are founded by them, precisely because of this connection - one of those unavoidable equivocations by transfer that are harmless as soon as they are recognized as such and the original and the derived have been fully distinguished.

§ 139 Interweaving of all kinds of reason. Theoretical, axiological and practical truth.

A proposition, whatever its quality, has its right according to what has been said so far as a proposition of its sense, if it is reasonable; the character of reason is itself the character of rightness, which "comes" to it essentially, i.e. not as an accidental fact under the accidental circumstances of a factually propositional I. Correlatively, the *proposition* is also called justified: in the consciousness of reason it is endowed with the noematic character of law, which again belongs essentially to the proposition as the noematic thesis thus qualified and to this sensory matter. More precisely, a fullness of this kind "belongs" to it, which in turn establishes the rational distinction of the thesis.

The sentence has its right to itself here. But it can also "*speak something for a proposition*", it can have a share in reason without being reasonable "itself". To remain in the doxic sphere, we recall the peculiar connection of the doxic modalities with the primal doxa : they all point back to it. If, on the other hand, we consider the characters of reason belonging to these modalities, the thought suggests itself from the outset that, however different the materials and motivations may be, they all point back, so to speak, to a primordial character of reason that belongs to the domain of primordial faith: to the case of original and ultimately perfect evidence. It becomes clear that there are profound essential connections between the two types of rejection.

Just to suggest the following: An assumption can be characterized as reasonable in itself. If we follow the rejection of the corresponding original belief in it and adopt it as our own in the form of an "assumption", then "something speaks for it". It is not faith itself, per se, that is characterized as reasonable, even though it shares in reason. As we can see, further rational-theoretical distinctions and related research are necessary here. Essential connections stand out between the *various* qualities with their peculiar rational characters, and indeed *reciprocally*; and *finally all lines run back to primordial faith* and its *primordial reason*, or to "*truth*".

Truth is obviously the correlate of the perfect rational character of the primal doxa, the certainty of faith. The expressions: "A primal doxic proposition, for example a proposition, is true" and: "The corresponding belief, judgment has the perfect character of reason" - are equivalent correlates. Of course, there is no mention of the fact of an experience and a judgment,

even though it is eidetically self-evident that the truth can only be currently given in a current awareness of evidence and thus also the truth of this self-evidence itself, that of the aforementioned equivalence, etc. If we lack the primordial doxic evidence, that of certainty of belief, then, let us say, a doxic modality can be evident for its meaning "S is p", such as the supposition "S might be p". This modal evidence is obviously equivalent to and necessarily connected with an original doxic evidence of a changed sense, namely with the evidence, or with the truth: "That S is p is presumably (probably)"; on the other hand also with the truth: "Something speaks for the fact that S is p"; and again: "Something speaks for the fact that S is p" and so on. All of this indicates essential connections that require phenomenological research into origins.

Evidence, however, is by no means a mere title for such occurrences of reason in the sphere of belief (and even only in that of predicative judgment), but *for all thetic spheres* and especially also for the significant relations of reason that run *between* them.

This therefore concerns the highly difficult and far-reaching problem groups of reason in the sphere of the theses of the mind and will, as well as the interweaving of these with "theoretical", i.e. doxical reason. The "theoretical" or "*doxological truth*", or *evidence*, has its parallel in the "*axiological and practical truth, or evidence*", whereby the "truths" of the latter titles are expressed and recognized in doxological truths, namely in specifically logical (apophantic) ones. It need not be said that for the treatment of these problems investigations of the kind we have attempted to tackle above must be fundamental: concerning the essential relations which link the doxical theses with all other modes of positing, those of mind and will, and again those which trace all doxical modalities back to the primal doxa. This is precisely the reason why certainty of faith and, accordingly, truth play such a predominant role in all reason; a role which, incidentally, also makes it self-evident that the problems of reason in the doxic sphere must precede those of axiological and practical reason with regard to their solution.

§ 140 Confirmation. Justification without evidence. Equivalence of positional and neutral insight.

Further study is necessary with regard to the problems presented to us by the *connections of congruence*", which (to mention only one excellent case) are to be established *between acts of the same sense and proposition, but of different rational value* according to their nature. For example, an evident act and a non-evident act can coincide, whereby in the transition from the latter to the former the latter takes on the character of the evident, the latter of the evident. The evident proposition of the one functions as "confirming" for the non-evident proposition of the other. The "proposition" "proves" or "confirms" itself, the imperfect state of affairs is transformed into the perfect one. What this process looks like, can look like, is predetermined by the nature of the types of proposition in question, or by the nature of the respective propositions in their perfect fulfillment. For each genre of propositions, the forms of principally possible fulfillment must be clarified phenomenologically.

If the proposition is not unreasonable, we can infer from its nature motivated possibilities for how it can be transformed into an actual rational proposition that proves it. It can be seen that not every imperfect evidence prescribes a course of fulfillment that terminates in a *corresponding* original evidence, in one of the same sense; on the contrary, certain types of evidence rule out such an original proving, so to speak, in principle. This applies, for example, to recollection and,

to a certain extent, to all memory in general, as well as to empathy, to which we will assign a basic type of evidence in the next book (and which we will examine in more detail there). In any case, these are very important phenomenological topics.

It should also be noted that the motivated possibility mentioned above differs sharply from the empty possibility: it is definitely motivated by what the proposition, as fulfilled as it is given, includes in itself. It is an empty possibility that this desk here, on the now unseen underside, has ten feet instead of four as in reality. On the other hand, this number of four is a motivated possibility for the particular perception that I am currently carrying out. It is motivated for every perception in general that the perceptual "circumstances" *can* change in certain ways, that "as a result" of this the perception *can* change in corresponding ways into series of perceptions, into certain ones that are predetermined by the sense of my perception and that fulfill it, confirm its positing.

Incidentally, with regard to the "empty" or "mere" possibility of expulsion, two further cases must be distinguished: Either the *possibility coincides with reality*, namely in such a way that the realization of the possibility eo ipso entails the *original* consciousness of the given and consciousness of reason; or this is not the case. The latter is the case in the example just used. *Real experience* and not merely a passing through of "possible" perceptions in visualization provides a real *designation of posits that go to the real*, such as the posits of existence of natural processes. On the other hand, in every case of a *proposition of essence*, or a proposition of essence, the *vivid visualization of its complete fulfilment is equivalent to the fulfilment itself*, just as a priori the vivid visualization, indeed the mere imagination of a context of essence and the insight into it are "equivalent", i.e. the one merges into the other by a mere change of attitude, and the possibility of this mutual transfer is not accidental, but essential.

§ 141 Direct and indirect reasoning. Indirect evidence.

As is well known, all indirect justification leads back to direct justification. The *original source of all law*, with regard to all subject areas and propositions related to them, lies in the direct, and more narrowly limited, in the *original evidence*, or in the original fact that motivates it. From this source, however, it is possible to draw indirectly in various ways, to derive from it the rational value of a proposition that has no evidence in itself, or, if it is direct, to affirm and confirm it.

Let us consider the latter case. Let us indicate in an example the difficult problems concerning the *relation of non-evident immediate reasoning to original evidence* (in our sense of originality of the given).

In *a certain* sense, every clear *memory* has an original, direct right: considered in and of itself, it "weighs" something, whether a lot or a little, it has a "weight". But it only has a relative and imperfect right. With regard to what it visualizes, let's say a past, it has a relationship to the present. It sets the past and necessarily sets a horizon with it, albeit in a vague, dark, indeterminate way; brought to clarity andthetic distinctness, this would have to be explicable in a context of thetically executed memories, which would terminate *in current perceptions, in the current hic et nunc*. The same applies to all kinds of memories in our *broadest* sense, referring to all modes of time.

Such sentences unmistakably express insights into essence. They point to the essential contexts, with the demonstration of which the meaning and the nature of the proof, which every

memory is capable of and "in need of", would be clarified. With each progression from memory to memory into the clarifying memory context, the final end of which reaches into the perceptual present, the memory affirms itself. The affirmation is to a certain extent reciprocal, the weights of memory are functionally interdependent, each memory in the context has a growing power with the expansion of the same, a greater power than it would have in a narrower context or in isolation. However, if the explication is carried out up to the *actual now*, then something of the *light of perception and its evidence radiates back onto the whole series*.

One could even say that *the reasonableness, the rightful character of memory arises covertly from the power of perception* that is effective through all confusion and darkness, even if it is "out of execution".

In any case, however, such proof is *needed* in order to make clear *what* actually bears the indirect reflection of the right of perception. Memory has its *own kind of inadequacy* in that what is not remembered can be mixed with what is "really remembered", or that different memories can assert themselves and pass themselves off as the unity of a memory, while in the actualizing unfolding of its horizon the associated series of memories separate in such a way that the unified image of memory "explodes", diverges into a majority of mutually incompatible views of memory: whereby similar occurrences would have to be described as which we have occasionally indicated (in an obviously very generalizable way) for perceptions.

All this serves as an exemplary indication of large and important problem groups of the "*affirmation*" and "*proof*" of direct reasoning (as well as to illustrate the separation of reasoning into pure and impure, unmixed and mixed); above all, however, one grasps here a sense in which the proposition applies that all indirect reasoning, and subsequently all predicative and conceptual knowledge of reason, leads back to *evidence*. It is well understood that only original evidence is the "original" source of law, and that, for example, the reasoning of memory and thus of all reproductive acts, including empathy, is not original and in certain ways "derived".

However, it can also be drawn from the source of the original given in completely different forms.

One such form has already been hinted at occasionally: the attenuation of rational values in the constant transition from living evidence to non-evidence. Now, however, a substantially different group of cases should be pointed out, where a proposition is *indirectly* related to directly evident reasons in a *synthetic context that is evident* in all steps. This gives rise to a new general type of reasoning, phenomenologically of a different rational character from direct evidence. Thus here too we have a kind of derived, "*indirect evidence*" - the kind to which the expression is usually exclusively directed. By its very nature, this derived character of evidence can only occur in the final link of a context of positing that proceeds from direct evidence in various forms and is supported by evidence in all further steps; whereby these evidences are partly direct, partly already derived; partly insightful, partly un insightful, original or non-original. This marks a new field in the phenomenological theory of reason. The task here is to study, in noetic and noematic terms, the general as well as the special essential occurrences of *reason in indirect reasoning*, in all kinds and forms and in all thetic spheres, the various "principles" of such reasoning, which are, for example which are essentially different, depending on whether they are immanent or transcendent, adequate or inadequate objects, back to their phenomenological origins and make them "understandable" from these, taking into account all the phenomenological layers involved.

§ 142 Reason Thesis and Being.

With the general understanding of the essence of reason, which is the aim of the groups of investigations indicated above - of reason in the broadest sense, extending to *all types of positing*, including axiological and practical ones - the general elucidation of the correlations of essence connecting the *idea of true being* with the ideas of truth, reason and consciousness must eo ipso be gained.

A general insight very soon emerges here, namely that not only "truly existing object" and "object to be rationally posited" are equivalent correlates, but also "truly existing object" and object to be posited in an original perfect reason-thesis. The object would not be incompletely, not merely "one-sidedly" given to this reason-thesis. The sense that underlies it as matter would not leave anything "open" for the determinable X on any side that is conceptually predetermined: no determinability that is not yet firmly determined, no sense that is not fully determined, completed. Since the rational thesis is supposed to be an original one, it must have its rational ground in the *original givenness* of the fully determined: The X is not only meant in full determinateness, but is originally given in this very determinateness. The indicated equivalence now says:

In principle, the *idea of a possible consciousness* corresponds (in the a priori of the unconditional generality of essence) to every "truly being" object, in which the object itself is *originally* and thereby *completely adequately* graspable. Conversely, if this possibility is guaranteed, the object is eo ipso truly being.

The following is of particular importance here: In the essence of every *category of conception* (which is the correlate of every category of object) it is definitely predetermined which forms of concrete, perfect or imperfect conceptions of objects of such a category are possible. In turn, it is essentially predetermined for every imperfect conception how it is to be perfected, how its meaning is to be completed, how it is to be fulfilled through perception, and how perception is to be further enriched.

Every category of object (or every region and every category in our narrower, concise sense) is a general being that can itself in principle be brought to adequate givenness. *In its adequate givenness* it prescribes an *insightful general rule* for every particular object that becomes conscious in manifoldnesses of concrete experiences (which experiences here are of course not to be taken as individual singularities, but as beings, as lowest concreta). It prescribes the rule for the way in which an object subject to it is to be brought to full definiteness, to adequate original givenness, according to sense and mode of givenness; through which isolated or continuously running contexts of consciousness and through which concrete essential features of these contexts. How much lies in these short sentences will become clear in the more detailed explanations in the final chapter (from § 149 onwards). Here a brief exemplary indication will suffice: the unseen determinations of a thing are, as we know with apodictic evidence, like determinations of things in general, necessarily spatial: this gives a lawful rule for possible spatial complements of the uncertain sides of the appearing thing; a rule which, fully developed, is called pure geometry. Further material determinations are temporal and material: they include new rules for possible (i.e. not arbitrary) additions to the senses and, subsequently, for possible thetical views or phenomena. The essential content of these can be , the norms under which their substances, their possible noematic (or noetic) perceptual characters stand, is also predetermined a priori.

§ 143 Adequate thing-giveness as idea in the Kantian sense.

But before we take up this point, it is necessary to add something in order to remove the appearance of contradiction with our earlier account (p. 286). We said that there are, in principle, only inadequately appearing (and therefore only inadequately perceptible) objects. However, the restrictive addition we made should not be overlooked. We said inadequately perceptible *in completed appearance*. There are objects - and all transcendental objects, all "*realities*" encompassed by the title nature or world, belong here - that cannot be given in any self-contained consciousness in complete definiteness and in equally complete vividness.

But as an "*idea*" (in the Kantian sense), *the perfect given is nevertheless predetermined* - as a system of endless processes of continuous appearance that is absolutely determined in its essential type, or as a field of these processes, an a priori determined *continuum of appearances* with different but determined dimensions, dominated by a fixed law of essence.

This continuum defines itself more precisely as an all-round infinite continuum, consisting in all its phases of phenomena of the same determinable X, ordered coherently and determined according to its essential content in such a way that any *line* of it in its continuous passage results in a unanimous context of phenomena (which itself is to be described as a unity of moving phenomena), in which the one and the same X, which is always given, continuously and unanimously determines itself "closer" and never "differently".

Now if a completed unity of traversal, i.e. a finite, merely mobile act, is inconceivable due to the all-sided infinity of the continuum (this would result in a contradictory finite infinity), then the idea of this continuum and the idea of the perfect given constituted by the same is nevertheless *insightful* - as insightful as an "*idea*" can be, denoting by its nature *its own type of insight*.

The idea of an essentially motivated infinity is not itself an infinity; the insight that this infinity cannot be given in principle does not exclude, but rather demands, the obvious givenness of the *idea* of this infinity.

§ 144 Reality and original consciousness: Concluding provisions.

It thus remains the case that the eidos being-true is correlatively equivalent to the eidos being-adequately-given and evidence-settable - but either in the sense of finite givenness or givenness in the form of an idea. In one case, being is "immanent" being, being as a completed experience or noematic correlate of experience; in the other case, it is transcendent being, i.e. being whose "transcendence" is located precisely in the infinity of the noematic correlate that it demands as "matter" of being.

Where a giving view is *adequate* and *immanent*, sense and object do not coincide, but originally fulfilled sense and object do. The object is precisely that which is grasped and posited in the adequate view as an original self, is comprehensible by virtue of originality, absolutely comprehensible by virtue of the completeness of sense and the complete original fulfillment of sense.

Where the giving view is a *transcending* one, the objective cannot come to adequate givenness; only the *idea* of such an objective, or its sense and its "cognitive essence", and thus an a priori rule for the very lawful infinities of inadequate experiences can be given.

On the basis of the experiences carried out in each case and this rule (or the manifold system of rules that it concludes), it cannot, of course, be clearly inferred how the further course of experience must take place. On the contrary, an infinite number of possibilities remain open, but these are predetermined in type by the very rich a priori rules. The system of rules of geometry determines absolutely firmly all possible forms of movement that could complement the piece of movement observed here and now, but it does not characterize a single real course of movement of the real mover. How empirical thinking based on experience helps here; how something like scientific determination of things as experientially determined units, which nevertheless include infinite ambiguities, becomes possible; how, within the thesis of nature, the goal of unambiguous determination according to the *idea* of the natural object, the natural process, etc. (which as the idea of an individually unique entity is the only one) becomes possible. (which is fully determined as the idea of an individually unique entity) can be achieved: this belongs to a new layer of research. It belongs to the phenomenology of specifically experiential, and in particular of physical, psychological, generally scientific reason, which traces the ontological and noetic rules that belong to empirical science as such back to their phenomenological sources. This means, however, that it seeks out and eidetically investigates the phenomenological layers, the noetic and noematic layers, in which the content of these rules is embedded.

§ 145 Critical aspects of the phenomenology of evidence.

From these considerations it is clear that the *phenomenology of reason, noetics in a concise sense*, which does not want to subject consciousness in general, but rather the consciousness of reason to an intuitive investigation, absolutely presupposes general phenomenology. *The fact that - in the realm of positionality - thetical consciousness of every genus is subject to norms* is itself a phenomenological fact; the norms are nothing other than laws of essence that refer to certain noetic-noematic contexts that are to be strictly analyzed and described according to their nature and form. Of course, "*unreason*" as the negative counterpart of reason must also be taken into account everywhere, just as the phenomenology of evidence includes that of its counterpart, *absurdity*. *The general doctrine of the essence of evidence*, with its analyses of the most general distinctions of essence, forms a relatively small, albeit fundamental, part of the phenomenology of reason. What was briefly asserted at the beginning of this book against the erroneous interpretations of evidence is confirmed here - and the considerations just made suffice to make this perfectly clear.

Evidence is not, indeed, some index of consciousness attached to a judgment (and one usually speaks of evidence only in the case of such a judgment), calling out to us like a mystical voice from a better world: Here is the truth! as if such a voice had something to say to us free spirits and did not have to prove its legal title. We no longer need to deal with skepticisms and to consider doubts of the old type, which no index and feeling theory of evidence can overcome: whether a lying spirit (of Cartesian fiction) or a fatal change in the factual course of the world could not cause every false judgment to be endowed with this very index, this feeling of the necessity of thought, the transcendent ought, and the like. If one approaches the study of the phenomena belonging here oneself and within the framework of phenomenological reduction, one recognizes with complete clarity that what is involved here is a peculiar mode of positing (thus nothing less than a content somehow attached to the act, an appendage of whatever kind), which belongs to eidetically determined constitutions of the essence of the noema (e.g. the mode

of original insight into the noematic constitution of "originally" giving perception of essence). It is then further recognized that, again, laws of essence regulate the relation of those positional acts that do not have this distinguished constitution to those that do; that there is, for example, something like consciousness of the "*fulfilment of intention*", of the justification and affirmation specifically related to the thetic characters, as well as the corresponding *counter-characters of disenfranchisement, invalidation*. Subsequently, one recognizes that the logical principles demand a deep phenomenological elucidation, and that, for example, the proposition of contradiction leads us back to the essential connections of possible justification and possible invalidation (or sensible crossing out). In general, one gains the insight that everywhere we are not dealing here with accidental facts, but with eidetic occurrences that stand in their eidetic context, and that therefore what takes place in the eidos functions as an absolutely insurmountable norm for the factum. In this phenomenological chapter it is also made clear that not every positional experience (e.g. every arbitrary experience of judgment) can become evident in the same way, and especially that not every experience can become directly evident; furthermore, that all ways of reasoning, all types of direct or indirect evidence are rooted in phenomenological contexts in which the fundamentally different regions of objects are noetically and noematically set apart.

It is particularly important to study the continuous unifications of identity and the synthetic identifications in all areas systematically according to their phenomenological constitution. Once we have become acquainted with the inner construction of intentional experiences according to all general structures, the parallelism of these structures, the stratifications in the noema, such as sense, sense-subject, thetic characters, fullness, which is the first thing that is necessary, we must make it completely clear in the case of all synthetic unifications how with them not merely act connections take place at all, but connections to the unity *of an* act. In particular, how identifying unifications are possible, how here and there the determinable X comes to coincide, how the sense determinations and their empty spaces, that is, here their moments of indeterminacy, behave; likewise how the fillings, how the forms of affirmation, of expulsion, of progressive cognition in lower and higher levels of consciousness come to clarity and analytical insight.

These and all parallel studies of reason, however, are carried out in the "transcendental", the phenomenological attitude. No judgment that is made there is a natural judgment that presupposes the thesis of natural reality as a background, and not even where phenomenology of the consciousness of reality, of the knowledge of nature, of the nature-related view of value and insight into value is pursued. Everywhere we pursue the formations of noeses and noemata, we sketch a systematic and eidetic morphology, everywhere we emphasize essence necessities and essence possibilities: the latter as necessary possibilities, i.e. unifying forms of compatibility that are prescribed in the *essences* and delimited by essence laws. For us, "object" is everywhere a title for essential contexts of consciousness; it first appears as noematic X, as the sense subject of various essential types of senses and propositions. It also appears as the title "real object" and is then the title for certain eidetically considered contexts of reason in which the X that is unified in them in terms of meaning receives its rational positing.

Similar titles for certain groups of "teleologically" related forms of consciousness that are eidetically delimited and to be fixed in essence research are the expressions "possible object", "probable", "doubtful", and so on. Again and again the contexts are others that are to be strictly described in their otherness: for example, it is easy to see that *the possibility* of X determined in such and such a way is not only shown by original givenness of this X in its meaning, i.e. by

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proof of reality, but also that mere reproductively founded impressions can mutually affirm each other in unanimous conclusion; likewise that *doubtfulness* is shown in conflict phenomena between modalized views of a certain descriptive kind, etc. This is connected with the investigations of the theory of reason, which refer to the differentiation of things, values, practical objects, and which pursue the consciousness-formations constituting themselves for these. Thus phenomenology really encompasses the whole natural world and all the ideal worlds that it eliminates: it encompasses it as "world-sense" through the laws of essence that link object-sense and noema in general with the closed system of noeses, and especially through the law-of-reason contexts of essence whose correlate is "real object", which in turn represents an index for quite specific systems of teleologically unified forms of consciousness.

THIRD CHAPTER

Levels of generality of the problem of reason theory

Our meditations on the problems of a phenomenology of reason have so far moved at a level of generality that has not allowed the essential ramifications of the problems and their connections with the formal and regional ontologies to emerge. In this respect we must try to come closer; only then will the full meaning of the phenomenological eidetics of reason and the whole richness of its problems be revealed to us.

§ 146 The most general problems.

Let us go back to the sources of the problem of reason and follow them as systematically as possible in their ramifications.

The title of the problem that encompasses the whole of phenomenology is intentionality. It expresses precisely the basic characteristic of consciousness; all phenomenological problems, even the hyletic ones, are subordinated to it. Thus phenomenology begins with problems of intentionality, but initially in general terms and without drawing the questions of the reality (truth) of what is conscious in consciousness into its circle. The fact that positional consciousness with itsthetic characters can be described in the most general sense as a "presupposition" and as such is necessarily subject to the rational opposition of validity and invalidity is left out of consideration. We have now been able to approach these problems in the last chapters, with regard to the main structures of consciousness that have now become comprehensible to us. Since we are dealing with eidetic beginnings, we naturally carried out the analyses in the greatest possible generality. In all eidetic spheres, the systematic path goes from higher to lower generality, even if the tracing analysis ties in with the particular. We have spoken of reason and reason-thesis in general, of original and derived, of adequate and inadequate evidence, of essential insight and individual evidence, and so on. The descriptions we developed already presupposed a large phenomenological basis, a whole series of difficult distinctions that we had worked out in the chapters on the most general structures of consciousness. Without the concepts of sense, proposition, fulfilled proposition (epistemological being in the speech of the "Logical Investigations") it is impossible to approach the radical formulation of any problem of reason theory. These concepts presuppose others and their corresponding distinctions of essence: the distinctions of positionality and neutrality, those ofthetic characters and their materials, the separation of the peculiar modifications of essence that do not enter into the eidosis proposition, such as attentional modifications, and so on. We emphasize at the same time, so as not to underestimate the scope of necessary analyses in the most general rational-theoretical layer of which we speak here, that the descriptions of essence in the last chapter should be regarded as mere beginnings. Here, as everywhere else, our methodological intention was merely to gain enough solid ground for each fundamentally new layer to be described as a field of phenomenological research so that we could assure ourselves of it, formulate the initial and basic problems relating to it and take a clear view of the problem horizon surrounding it.

§ 147 Branches of the problem. Formal logic, axiology and practice.

The general phenomenology of reason branches out when we take into account further structural differences that are decisive for the characters of reason: the differences according to

the basic types of theses, the differences between simple and well-founded theses and the intersecting differences between univocal theses and syntheses. The main groups of problems of reason (problems of evidence) refer to the main types of theses and to the essential positing materials required by them. In the first place, of course, are the primal doxa, the doxic modalities with their corresponding modalities of being.

In the pursuit of such rational-theoretical goals, one necessarily arrives at the *problems of the rational-theoretical elucidation of formal logic* and its parallel disciplines, which I have called *formal axiology and practice*.

Let us first refer to the earlier remarks on the pure form doctrines of propositions and especially of *synthetic* propositions, with reference to the predicative doxic synthesis, as well as to the synthetic forms belonging to the doxic modalities, and furthermore to the acts of mind and will. (For example, the forms of preference, those of valuing and willing "for the sake of another", the forms of the axiological "and" and "or"). These doctrines of forms speak noematically of synthetic propositions in their pure form, without any question of reasonableness or non-reasonableness. They therefore do not yet belong to the layer of the doctrine of reason.

But as soon as we raise this question, and indeed for propositions in general insofar as they are thought to be determined exclusively by the pure forms, we find ourselves in formal logic and in the above-mentioned formal parallel disciplines, which by their nature are built on the corresponding theories of forms as their sub-stages. *In the synthetic forms* - which as such of theses or propositions of the relevant *category* of propositions obviously presuppose many things but leave them undetermined in their particularity - *lie a priori conditions of possible validity, which are expressed in the essential laws of the disciplines in question*.

Specifically, the pure forms of *predicative* (analytic) synthesis contain a priori conditions of the possibility of *doxical certainty of reason*, noematically speaking *possible truth*. Their objective realization is carried out by formal logic in the narrowest sense: *formal apophantics* (the formal logic of "judgments"), which thus has its foundation in the theory of forms of these "judgments".

The same applies to the syntheses belonging to the sphere of mind and will and their noematic correlates, i.e. to their kinds of synthetic "propositions", whose systematic theory of forms must again provide the basis for the construction of the formal doctrines of validity. It is precisely in the pure synthetic *forms* of these spheres (as, for example, in the connections between ends and means) *that the conditions of the possibility of axiological and practical "truth"* really lie. In the process, by virtue of "objectification", which also takes place, for example, in the acts of the mind, all axiological and practical *reasonableness* turns into doxic reasonableness and noematically into *truth*, objectively into *reality* in the way we understand: we speak of true or real ends, means, excellences, etc.

All of these connections are, of course, the subject of our own and highly important phenomenological investigations. The very nature of the characterization of the formal disciplines just given is phenomenological and presupposes much from our analyses. The researcher in *pure logic*, which is treated "dogmatically", abstractly grasps the apophantic forms ("proposition at all" or "judgment", categorical, hypothetical, conjunctive, disjunctive judgment, etc.) and fixes for the axioms of formal truth. He knows nothing of analytical synthesis, of noetic-noematic relations of essence, of the classification of the essences he has identified and conceptually fixed into the complexes of essence of pure consciousness; he investigates in isolation what can only find its full understanding in this full context of essence. Only

phenomenology makes clear to us what actually lies in it by reverting to the sources of intuition in transcendently purified consciousness, when we speak sometimes of formal conditions of truth and sometimes of such conditions of cognition. In general, it enlightens us about the *nature and essential relationships* that belong to the concepts of cognition, evidence, truth, being (object, facts, etc.); it teaches us to understand the structure of judgment and of the judgment, the way in which the structure of the noema determines cognition, how the "proposition" plays its special role in this, and again the various possibilities of its cognitive "fullness". It shows which modes of fulfillment are essential conditions for the rational character of evidence, which types of evidence are in question in each case, and so on. In particular, it allows us to understand that the *a priori truths of logic* are essential connections between the *possibility of intuitive fulfillment* of the proposition (whereby the corresponding facts come to synthetic perception) and the *pure synthetic form* of the proposition (the pure logical form), and that at the same time this possibility is the condition of possible validity.

It also shows that, strictly speaking, there is a double distinction to be made here, corresponding to the correlation of noesis and noema. In formal apophantics (e.g. in syllogistics) there is talk of judgments, as noematic propositions, and their "formal truth". The attitude is definitely noematic. On the other hand, in *formal apophantic noetics* the attitude is noetic, there is talk of the reasonableness, correctness of judgment, *norms* of this correctness are expressed, namely in relation to the forms of propositions. For example, a contradiction cannot be considered true; whoever judges according to the premise forms of the valid modes of inference "must" draw consequences of the corresponding forms, etc. In a phenomenological context, these parallels become readily comprehensible. The occurrences that concern judgment, the noesis, as well as the essentially corresponding ones in the noema, the apophansis, are explored precisely in their necessary interrelation and in the full interweaving of consciousness.

The same applies, of course, to the other formal disciplines with regard to the parallelism of noetic and noematic rules.

§ 148 Problems of the theory of reason in formal ontology.

From these disciplines, a turn leads us to the corresponding *ontologies*. The connection is already given phenomenologically by the generally possible turns of gaze that can be carried out within each act, whereby the states that they bring into view are mutually interwoven through various laws of essence. The primary attitude is towards the representational, the noematic reflection leads to the noematic, the noetic to the noetic inventories. From these stocks, the disciplines of interest to us here abstractly grasp pure forms, namely the formal apophantics noematic, the parallel noetics noetic forms. Just as these forms are linked to each other, both are linked to ontic forms in terms of their essential laws, which can be grasped by turning the gaze back to ontic stocks.

Every formal-logical law can be equivalently transformed into a formal-ontological one. Instead of judgments, we now judge facts, instead of elements of judgment (e.g. nominal meanings) we judge objects, instead of predicate meanings we judge characteristics, and so on. The talk is also no longer of the truth, validity of the sentences of judgment, but of the existence of the facts, of the being of the objects, etc.

Of course, the phenomenological content of this phrase must also be clarified by referring back to that of the relevant terms.

Formal ontology, by the way, goes far beyond the sphere of such mere transformations of formal apophantic truths. Large disciplines grow to it through those "nominalizations" of which we spoke earlier. In plural judgments the plural appears as plural thesis. Through the nominalizing turn, it becomes the object set, and thus the basic concept of *set theory* emerges. In this theory, sets are judged as objects that have their own peculiar kinds of properties, relations, etc. The same applies to the concepts of relation, number, etc., as basic concepts of *mathematical disciplines*. Again we have to say, as in the case of the mere formal doctrines of propositions, that it is not the task of phenomenology to develop these disciplines, i.e. to do mathematics, syllogistics, etc. . It is only interested in the axioms and their conceptual inventory as a title for phenomenological analyses.

What has been said is automatically transferred to *formal axiology and practice*, as well as to the *formal ontologies of values* (in a very extended sense), of goods - in short, of the entire ontic spheres that are correlates of the consciousness of mind and will, which are to be assigned to them as theoretical desiderata.

One notices that the concept of "formal ontology" has expanded in these considerations. The values, the practical objects, are subordinated to the formal title "object", "something in general". From the point of view of universal analytical ontology, they are thus materially determined objects, and the "formal" ontologies of values and practical objects that belong to them are material disciplines. On the other hand, the analogies founded in the parallelism of the thetical genres (belief, or the modality of belief, values, volition) and the syntheses and syntactical formations specifically assigned to them have their force, and one so effective that Kant actually describes the relationship between the volition of the end and the volition of the means as "analytical" and thereby confuses analogy with identity. The actual analytic, that which belongs to the predicative synthesis of the doxa, must not be confused with its formal analog, which is related to the syntheses of the theses of mind and will. Deep-seated and important problems of the phenomenology of reason are linked to the radical elucidation of these analogies and parallels.

§ 149 The problems of reason theory in regional ontologies. The problem of phenomenological constitution.

Once we have discussed the problems of reason theory posed by the formal disciplines, it is time to move on to the *material ones*, starting with the *regional ontologies*.

Every objective region constitutes itself consciously. An object determined by the regional genus has as such, insofar as it is more real, its a priori predetermined ways of being perceptible, at all clearly or obscurely conceivable, conceivable, demonstrable. We thus return to the senses, propositions, epistemic beings with regard to the foundation of reason; but now not to mere forms, but, since we have the material generality of the regional and categorical essence in mind, to propositions whose determinative content is taken in its *regional* determinacy. *Each region here provides the guideline for its own closed group of investigation.*

We take the region of the material thing, for example, as a guideline. If we understand correctly what this guideline means, we grasp at the same time a general problem that is decisive for a large and relatively self-contained phenomenological discipline: *the problem of the general "constitution" of the objecthoods of the region thing in transcendental consciousness*, or to put it more briefly, "the phenomenological constitution of the thing in general". In one with this we

also become acquainted with the method of investigation assigned to this leading problem. The same then applies to *each* region and each discipline related to its phenomenological constitution.

It is the following. The idea of the thing, to remain with this region, is, when we speak of it now, consciously represented by the conceptual thought "thing" with a certain noematic stock. Each noema corresponds essentially to an ideally closed group of possible noemas, which have their unity in the fact that they are capable of synthetic unification through congruence. If the noema, as here, is a unanimous one, the group also contains descriptive and especially original noemas in which all the other noemas of the group fulfill themselves in the identifying congruence, drawing from them, in the case of positionality, confirmation and fullness of rational power.

So we start from the verbal, perhaps quite obscure idea of the thing as we have it at the moment. In freedom, we generate vivid ideas of the same "thing"-at all-and clarify the vague meaning of the word. Since we are dealing with a "general idea", we must proceed by way of example. We create any imaginary conceptions of things, such as free conceptions of winged horses, white ravens, mountains of gold, and the like; these, too, would be things, and conceptions of them serve for exemplification just as well as conceptions of things of real experience. In this way, performing ideation, we grasp with intuitive clarity the essence of the "thing" as the subject of generally delimited noematic determinations.

Now it is to be noted (in remembrance of what has already been established earlier) that here the being "thing" is indeed originally given, but that this given cannot in principle be an adequate given. We can bring the noema or the sense of thing to an adequate given; but the manifold senses of thing, even taken in their fullness, do not contain the regional essence of "thing" as an immanent original-visual stock, just as little as the manifold senses related to one and the same individual thing contain the individual essence of this thing. In other words, whether we are dealing with the essence of an individual thing or with the regional essence of a thing in general, in no case is a single conception of a thing or a finite continuity or collection of conceptions of a thing sufficient to *adequately* obtain the desired essence in the fullness of its essential determinations. However, any *inadequate* view of essence is sufficient; in contrast to an empty grasp of essence, such as is to be established on the exemplary foundation of a dark conception, it at least has the great advantage of having originally given the essence.

This applies to all levels of the generality of being, from the individual being up to the region thing.

Now, however, it is a general insight into the nature of things that *every imperfect given* (every inadequately giving noema) *contains within itself a rule for the ideal possibility of its perfection*. It is part of the essence of the centaur appearance that I now have - an appearance that gives the essence of the centaur merely "one-sidedly" - that I can pursue the various sides of the thing, that I can freely fantasize, determine and visualize what at first remains undetermined and open. We are *free to* a great extent in the progress of this ever more perfectly visualizing and more closely defining imaginative process; we can, after all, vividly attribute more closely defining properties and changes in properties to the imagined centaur at will; but *we are not completely free* if we are to proceed in the sense of a unanimous process of perception, in which the determinable subject is identically the same and *can* always remain as unanimously determinable. For example, we are bound by a legal *space* as a framework that the idea of a

possible thing prescribes for us. No matter how arbitrarily we may deform the imaginary, spatial forms are transformed back into spatial forms.

What does this talk of rule or law mean phenomenologically? What lies in the fact that the inadequately given *region "thing" prescribes rules for the course of possible views* - and that apparently means as much as possible perceptions?

The answer to this is: To the essence of such a thing-noema belong, and are absolutely comprehensible, ideal possibilities of "*boundlessness in the progress*" of unanimous views, namely according to typically determined directions (thus also parallel boundlessness in the continuous sequences of corresponding noses). We recall here the earlier remarks on the insightful acquisition of the general "idea" of the thing in general, which remain valid for every lower level of generality down to the lowest concretion of the individually determined thing. Its transcendence is expressed in those boundlessnesses in the progression of views of it. Again and again the perceptions are to be transformed into perceptual continua and the given continua are to be expanded. No perception of the thing is ultimately complete; there is always room for new perceptions that would define the indeterminacies more precisely, fulfill the unfulfilled. With each progression, the determinative content of the thingnoema, which constantly belongs to the same thing X, is enriched. It is an essential insight that *every* perception and perceptual multiplicity is capable of expansion, that the process is therefore an endless one; accordingly, no intuitive apprehension of the thing-being can be so complete that a further perception could not noematically add something new to it.

On the other hand, we grasp the "idea" thing with evidence and adequately. We grasp it in the *free* process of going through it, in the awareness of the boundlessness of the progression of unanimous views. We thus first grasp the unfulfilled idea of the thing, and of this individual thing, as something that is given "as far" as the unanimous view "reaches", but remains determinable "*in infinitum*". The "etc." is an insightful and absolutely indispensable moment in the thing-noema.

On the basis of the exemplary awareness of this boundlessness, we further grasp the "idea" of the particular directions of infinity, namely for each of the directions of the visual process that we pass through. Again, we grasp *the regional "idea" of the thing in general* as the identical, persisting in such particular infinities of the process and manifesting itself in the corresponding particular infinite series of noemen.

Like the thing, then, every *quality* belonging to its essence and above all every *constitutive "form"* is an idea, and this applies from the regional generality down to the lowest particularity. In more detail:

In its ideal essence, the thing presents itself as *res temporalis*, in the necessary "*form*" of time. Intuitive "ideation" (which, as "idea" contemplation, particularly deserves its name here) teaches us to know the thing as necessarily permanent, as endlessly extendable in principle with regard to its duration. In "*pure contemplation*" (for this ideation is the phenomenologically clarified concept of Kant's pure contemplation), we grasp the "idea" of temporality and all the essential moments resolved in it.

According to its idea, the thing is furthermore *res extensa*, it is, for example, capable of infinitely manifold transformations of form in spatial terms and, with identically fixed form and change of form, infinitely manifold changes of position, it is "movable" in infinitum. We grasp the "*idea*" of space and the ideas assigned to it.

The thing is finite *res materialis*, it is a *substantial* unity, as such a unity of *causalities* and, according to possibility, of infinitely manifold ones. We also encounter ideas with these specifically real properties. Thus *all* components of the thing-idea are themselves ideas, *each one implying the "and so on"* of "infinite" possibilities.

What we are doing here is not "theory", "metaphysics". We are dealing with essential necessities, irrevocably resolved in the thing-noema and correlatively in the thing-giving consciousness, which can be grasped quite intelligibly and explored systematically.

§ 150. continued. The region thing as a transcendental guide.

Once we have made the infinities that the concept of the thing as such (according to noesis and noema) contains within itself comprehensible in the most general terms - or as we can also say: the idea of the thing and what it contains in terms of dimensions of infinity - we will also soon be able to understand the extent to which *the region of the thing* can serve as a *guideline for* phenomenological investigations.

Looking at an individual thing, following its movements, its approaches and distances, its turns and twists, its changes of form and quality, its causal behaviours in contemplation, we *carry out* continuums of contemplation, covering each other in this and that way, merging into unity consciousness : the gaze is thereby directed towards the identical, towards the X of the sense (or the positional or neutralized proposition), towards the one and the same thing that changes, turns, and so on. This is also the case when, in *free* contemplation, we pursue the endlessly possible modifications according to the various basic directions, in the awareness of the boundlessness in the progress of this process of contemplation. And again in the same way when we pass over to the setting of ideation and bring the regional idea of the thing to clarity, for example: thus proceeding like the geometrician in the freedom and purity of his geometric view.

With all this, however, we know nothing of the processes of perception itself and the beings and essential infinities belonging to *it*, nothing of its substances and noetic moments, nothing of its noematic stocks, of the mutually distinguishable and eidetically graspable layers. We do not *see* what we currently experience (or are aware of in the unreflected modification of fantasy). It therefore requires a change of attitude, it requires the various hyletic, noetic, noematic "reflections" (all rightly so called because they are distractions from the original, "straight" line of sight on the X). It is these reflections that now open up a large, coherent field of research for us, or rather a powerful problematic under the idea of the thing-region.

The question arises:

How are the noeses and noems belonging to the unity of the vividly imagining consciousness of things to be systematically described?

If we stick to the noematic sphere, the question is:

What do the manifold posited views, the "*propositions of view*" look like, in which a "real" thing comes to reality and demonstrates its *reality* in terms of view, in original "experience"?

To abstract from the doxic thesis, what do the mere - noematically understood - *appearances* look like, which in themselves, viewed purely eidetically, "bring to appearance" one and the same thing, the respective quite specific thing that belongs to this manifoldness of perception or appearance as a *necessary* correlate? In principle, phenomenology does not stop at vague speeches, at obscure generalities; it demands systematically determined clarification, analysis

and description that penetrates into the essential contexts and into the ultimately attainable particularities of these: it demands *work* to be done.

The regional idea of the thing, its identical X with the determining sense content, set as being - *prescribes rules for manifolds of phenomena*. This says: they are not manifolds at all, randomly coming together, as already emerges from the fact that they have in themselves, purely essentially, a relation to the thing, the determinate thing. The idea of the region prescribes quite definite, definitely ordered, infinitely progressing series of appearances, taken as an ideal totality, firmly closed, a definite inner organization of their progressions, which is essentially and explorably connected with the partial ideas that are generally drawn in the regional idea of the thing as its components. It is shown, for example - as a part of this organization - that the unity of a mere *res extensa* is conceivable without the unity that normalizes the idea of *res materialis*: although no *res materialis* is conceivable that would not be *res extensa*. For it turns out (always in eidetic-phenomenological intuition) that every thing-appearance necessarily contains within itself a layer that we call the *thing-schema*: it is the mere spatial form filled with "sensual" qualities - without any determinacy of "substantiality" and "causality" (sc. in quotation marks, understood in a noematically modified way). Even the associated idea of a *mere res extensa* is a title for a wealth of phenomenological problems.

What we phenomenologically naive people take for mere facts: that a spatial thing always appears to "us humans" in a certain "orientation", e.g. in the visual field of vision oriented upwards and downwards, to the right and left, near and far; that we can only see a thing at a certain "depth", "distance"; that all changing distances at which it can be seen are related to an invisible but, as an ideal boundary point, familiar center of all depth orientations, "localized" by us in the head - all these alleged factualities, i.e. contingencies of the perception of space, which are alien to "true", "objective" space, prove to be essential necessities apart from minor empirical peculiarities. It thus becomes apparent that something like spatial reality is only visible not only to us humans, but also to God - as the ideal representative of absolute knowledge - through phenomena in which it is and must be given "perspectively" in manifold but certain ways and thereby in changing "orientations".

It is now necessary not only to substantiate this as a general thesis, but also to pursue it in all its individual forms. The problem of the "*origin of the conception of space*", whose deepest, phenomenological meaning has never been grasped, is reduced to the phenomenological *analysis of the essence* of all the noematic (or noetic) phenomena in which space presents itself vividly and "constitutes" itself as a unity of appearances, of descriptive modes of spatial representation.

The *problem of constitution* clearly states nothing other than that the regulated series of phenomena that *necessarily* belong together to form the unity of a phenomenon can be intuitively surveyed and theoretically grasped - despite their infinities (which are clearly controllable in the definite "and so on") - that they can be analyzed and described in their *eidetic* peculiarity, and that the *legal achievement of the correlation between the definite phenomenon as a unity and the definite infinite manifoldness of phenomena* can be fully understood and thus stripped of all mystery.

This is as true for the unity that lies in the *res extensa* (also *res temporalis*) as it is for the higher unities, the grounded ones, which the expression "*material thing*", i.e. *substantial-causal*, indicates. All these units constitute themselves at the level of experiential perception in "manifoldness", and everywhere the reciprocal interrelationships of essence must be illuminated completely, down to all layers, according to sense and the fullness of sense, according to the

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thetic functions, and so on. Finally, the perfect insight must arise from *what represents the idea of the real thing in phenomenologically pure consciousness*, as it is the absolutely necessary correlate of a structurally investigated and essentially described noetic-noematic connection.